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1 Introduction
Is war more likely between populations that di¤er in terms of ethnicity, culture and historical
legacies? Several commentators have argued that there is a general tendency towards violent
confrontation between populations that are culturally and ethnically distant. For example, Maynes
(1993, p. 5) wrote: "Animosity among ethnic groups is beginning to rival the spread of nuclear
weapons as the most serious threat to peace that the world faces." Bremer (2000, p. 27), referring
to evidence from social psychology, wondered whether "cultural di¤erences [...] should lead to
misunderstandings, stereotyping, clashes of values, and so forth, which in turn promote intercultural
ghts." This debate can partly be traced back to the sociologist William G. Sumner (1906), who
formulated the primordialist view that ethnic dissimilarity between groups should be associated
with "war and plunder," while societies that are ethnically and culturally related would tend to
ght less with each other.
In this paper we present new empirical ndings on the determinants of international conict
that strongly support the opposite view: populations that are more closely related are signicantly
more likely to engage in international conict, even after controlling for a variety of measures of
geographic proximity and other factors that a¤ect conict, including measures of trade and democ-
racy. We explain this surprising result with an economic model of relatedness and conict. The
starting point is that populations inherit preferences with variation from their ancestors. On av-
erage, populations that share more recent common ancestors are also more similar in preferences.
Similarity in preferences has very di¤erent implications for conict depending on whether popula-
tions ght over control of goods that are rival in consumption and goods that are non-rival (public
goods). Similarity is associated with a higher likelihood of conict over rival goods, while more
similar populations are less likely to ght over the control of public goods.
The central idea of this paper can be illustrated with a simple example. Consider two people
in a room with two sandwiches: a chicken sandwich and a ham sandwich. People who share more
similar preferences are more likely to want the same kind of sandwich, and possibly to ght over it,
while people with more diverse preferences are more likely to be happy with di¤erent sandwiches.
In contrast, suppose that there is a television set in the room, which both individuals must share.
Each can watch television without reducing the other persons utility from watching, but they may
disagree over which show to watch and ght over the remote control (public good). In this case,
people with more similar preferences are less likely to ght, because they can agree on the same
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show. Since people who are more closely related tend to have more similar preferences on average -
as they are passed along with variation from generation to generation - we expect that relatedness
should be associated with more conict when people ght over rival goods, and with less conict
when people ght over public goods.
What does this story have to do with international conict? Historically, international conict is
mostly about control of rival and excludable goods, such as territories, cities and natural resources.
The view that international conict is mostly about territories and resources is emphasized, for
instance, by Caselli, Morelli and Rohner (2012), who cite the results in Tir et al. (1998) and Tir
(2003) that 27% of all territorial changes between 1816 and 1996 involve full-blown military conict,
and 47% of territorial transfers involve some level of violence.1 In principle, sovereign states can
ght over public goods (i.e., policies to deal with international terrorism or climate change) but
historically such conicts are a small subset of international disputes, and, more importantly, they
are usually interlinked with control over rival resources. Conicts over public goods are more likely
to emerge among groups that belong to the same political jurisdictions and therefore share non-
rival and non-excludable goods and policies by institutional design. Therefore, our framework has
a straightforward implication for international conict: relatedness should be associated with a
higher probability of interstate war. In contrast, relatedness is likely to have ambiguous e¤ects on
intrastate conict, because, within states, di¤erent groups tend to ght over a complex and variable
mix of rival goods (i.e., natural resources) and non-rival goods (control over government type and
policies).
To measure relatedness between populations, we use information on human genetic distance -
a summary statistic of very long-run historical relatedness between populations. Genetic distance
measures the di¤erence in gene distributions between two populations, where the genes under
considerations are neutral: they change randomly and independently of selection pressure. Most
random genetic change takes place regularly over time, acting as a molecular clock (Kimura, 1968).
Consequently, genetic distance measures the time since two populations have shared common an-
cestors - i.e., since they were the same population. Divergence in neutral genes provides information
about lines of descent, so that genetic distance is a summary measure of general relatedness be-
tween populations.2 Heuristically, the concept is analogous to relatedness between individuals: two
1They also cite Weedes (1973, p. 87) view that "the history of war and peace is largely identical with the history
of territorial changes as results of war and causes of the next war."
2Specically, we use measures of FST distance between human populations from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994).
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siblings are more closely related than two cousins because they share more recent common ances-
tors - their parents rather than their grandparents. Since a very large number of characteristics
- including cultural traits - are transmitted across generations over the long run, genetic distance
provides a comprehensive measure of long-term distance in such traits across populations.
This papers main empirical result is that genetic distance signicantly reduces the risk of
conict, and the e¤ect is substantial in magnitude. Populations that are more closely related are
more likely to engage in interstate conict and wars, even after controlling for several geographic
variables, measures of linguistic and religious distance, and other factors that a¤ect interstate
conict, including trade and democracy. A one standard deviation increase in genetic distance
between two populations reduces that pairs probability of ever being in conict between 1816
and 2001 by 23:84%: The e¤ect of genetic distance is even higher (36:79%) when we instrument
for modern genetic distance using genetic distance between populations as of the year 1500, to
account for measurement error and possible endogeneity issues due to post-1500 migrations and
population mixing. In a nutshell, from a long-term world-wide perspective, issues of war and peace
are (unhappy) family matters.3
The negative e¤ect of genetic distance holds when controlling for measures of geography (conti-
guity, geodesic distance, latitudinal and longitudinal di¤erences, and other measures of geographic
barriers). The paramount e¤ect attributed by some scholars to geographic proximity (i.e., Gleditsch
and Singer, 1975, Vasquez, 1995) may in part be due to its correlation with cultural and histor-
ical relatedness. Once genetic distance is taken into account, geographic variables have smaller
e¤ects, although they remain signicant. In addition, the e¤ect of genetic distance is robust when
accounting for di¤erences in military capabilities and income per capita across countries. We also
control for other measures of cultural similarity, such as religious and linguistic distance. The e¤ect
of genetic distance is robust to such controls, and the e¤ects of linguistic distance and religious
The measure FST was rst suggested by the great geneticist and statistician Sewall Wright (1950). Interestingly,
Sewall was the older brother of Quincy Wright, the professor of international law who pioneered empirical research
on conict (Wright, 1942). According to Singer (2000): "The story has it that [Sewall] admired Quincys scholarship
and his preoccupation with the scourge of war but lamented the lack of methodological rigor in his work and thus
introduced him to the scientic method - hence the fteen-year project that culminated in the monumental Study of
War (1942)." We hope that the Wright brothers would appreciate our joining their two lines of research in a study
titled "War and Relatedness." The Wrights were a truly remarkable family. As explained in Stock and Trebbi (2003),
Sewall and Quincys father Philip Wright was the inventor of instrumental variables regression.
3We apologize to Leo Tolstoy for the double plagiarism.
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distance on international conict are in line with the main predictions of the model: cultural sim-
ilarity increases the probability of conict. In particular, the fact that religious distance reduces
the likelihood of war would be hard to rationalize within a clash-of-civilizations view (Huntington,
1993), but is consistent with the predictions of our framework. It is also worth noting that the e¤ect
of relatedness on conict holds not only for the whole sample (1816-2001), but also by historical
sub-periods, including for the post-Cold-War period (1990-2001).
Interesting results also emerge when adding measures of trade and democracy, to capture the
central predictions of liberal peace theory: extensive bilateral trade links and the extent of democ-
racy among countries in a pair should reduce their propensity to go to war.4 Not only are the e¤ect
of relatedness robust to controlling for trade and democracy variables, but the e¤ects of trade and
democracy on conict hold even after controlling for relatedness.5 We are therefore able to address
one of the most important criticisms of the empirical literature on this subject: observers who
believe that culturally related countries ght less with each other have often questioned whether
there is a direct causal link going from trade and democracy to lower conict, on the ground that
culturally more similar societies also tend to trade more with each other and to share more similar
political arrangements (such as democratic regimes). Following this reasoning, the observed low
level of conict might not be the direct e¤ect of trade and democracy, but rather the outcome
of deeper cultural similarities (for discussions of this debate see, for example, Schneider, Barbieri
and Gleditsch, 2003). In contrast, our estimates provide strong evidence that the premise that
closely related populations ght less with each other is incorrect, and hence cannot account for the
pacifying e¤ects of bilateral trade and democracy. In sum, our ndings validate the liberal view
concerning the pacifying e¤ects of trade and democracy, which continue to hold when controlling
for relatedness.
This paper is the rst, to our knowledge, to study the relationship between genetic distance
4The liberal peace view that trade and democracy should reduce the risk of war goes back to Montesquieu (1748)
and Kant (1795). Contributions on the empirics of trade and conict include Polacheck (1980), Oneal and Russett
(1999a, 1999b), Barbieri (2002), and Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008). On the democratic peace hypothesis see,
for instance, Maoz and Russett (1993), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), Gowa (2000), and Levy and Razin (2004).
5Our empirical analysis of the e¤ects of trade on conict builds closely on Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008),
and conrms their nding that bilateral trade reduces the risk of conict between a pair of states, but multilateral
trade increases the probability of conict.
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and the likelihood of interstate conicts and wars.6 It is part of a small but growing empirical
literature on the connections between long-term relatedness and societal outcomes. In particular,
while human genetic distance is not commonly used in the social sciences, recent work has pointed
out to its usefulness and predictive power in economics and related areas. Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009) document the relation between genetic distance and di¤erences in income per capita across
countries, and provide an economic interpretation in terms of barriers to the di¤usion of economic
development from the world technological frontier. Desmet et al. (2011) nd a close relationship
between genetic distance and cultural di¤erences measured by the World Values Survey, which sup-
ports our interpretation of genetic distance as a broad measure of di¤erences in intergenerationally-
transmitted traits, including cultural characteristics and preferences.7 Our paper is thereby related
to the evolutionary literature on cultural transmission of traits and preferences (Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2004; for economic analyses of
cultural transmission, see Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001) and to the growing empirical literature on
the deep historical roots of economic and political outcomes (recent contributions include Ashraf
and Galor, 2010, 2011; Putterman and Weil, 2010; and Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2010 and
2011, discussed among others in Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2012). Finally, this paper is part of a large
and growing literature using formal theory and systematic empirical analyses to provide insights
into the determinants of wars.8
6There are few formal or empirical analyses of the relations between war and genetic variables. Contributions
by economists are Hirshleifer (1998), who provided a theoretical discussion of the evolutionary motives for warfare,
including the "a¢ liative instinct" (partially related to the primordialist view), and, more recently, Bowles (2009),
who studies whether warfare among ancestral hunters-gathers may have a¤ected the evolution of group-benecial
behavior.
7Desmet et al. (2011) nd that European populations that are genetically closer give more similar answers to
a broad set of 430 questions about norms, values and cultural characteristics, included in the 2005 World Values
Suvey sections on perceptions of life, family, religion and morals. They also nd that the correlation between
genetic distance and di¤erences in cultural values remains positive and signicant after controlling for linguistic and
geographic distances.
8Economic analyses of conict and wars include Schelling (1960), Boulding (1962), and, among the more recent
contributions, Garnkel (1990), Skaperdas (1992), Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001), Alesina and Spolaore (2005,
2006), Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008), Jackson and Morelli (2007), Yared (2010), Caselli, Morelli and Rohner
(2012) among many others. Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007) provide an overview of the economics literature on
conict. Of course there exists a much larger literature on this topic in history (e.g., Blainey, 1988 and Ferguson,
2006) and in political science (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992, Fearon, 1995, Powell, 1999 and Russett and
5
While the theoretical and empirical focus of our paper is on interstate conict, a natural exten-
sion would be to study the e¤ects of relatedness on intrastate conict. As far as we know, there is
no study that directly explores the e¤ects of genetic relatedness on civil conict, perhaps because
of data limitations in measuring genetic relatedness between groups with the level of detail that a
within-country study would require. Of course, there is a huge literature that considers the e¤ects
of various measures of ethnic divisions on intrastate conict, with sometimes conicting results.
For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 82) in their inuential study of the e¤ects of ethnic
fractionalization on civil conict, concluded that the observed "pattern is thus inconsistent with
[. . . ] the common expectation that ethnic diversity is a major and direct cause of civil violence." In
contrast, the literature on ethnic polarization, pioneered by the theoretical contribution of Esteban
and Ray (1994) and the empirical work of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), leads to di¤erent
conclusions. In a recent empirical study of ethnicity and intrastate conict, Esteban, Mayoral and
Ray (2012), building on the previously cited papers, nd that when civil conict is mostly over
public goods, ethnolinguistic polarization leads to more conict. This nding is consistent with our
hypothesis that less closely related groups are more likely to ght over the control of public goods.
More broadly, since civil conicts are about a complex mix of disputes over rival and public goods,
our ndings are consistent with the lack of consensus found in the literature concerning the role of
ethnic divisions for civil conict.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of relatedness and
conict (extensions are included in the Appendix). Section 3 introduces the data and methodology.
Section 4 discusses the empirical ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Relatedness and Conict
In this section we present a theoretical framework linking genetic distance, intergenerationally-
transmitted preferences, and the probability of conict between societies. First, we model the
transmission of preferences over time with variation across populations. Populations that are more
closely related (i.e., at a smaller genetic distance) tend to have more similar preferences. Second, we
model conict over rival goods. Conict is more likely to arise when di¤erent populations strongly
Oneal, 2001). Systematic empirical work on interstate conict was pioneerd by Wright (1942), Richardson (1960) and
Singer (1972). For discussions of the empirical literature on the correlates of war see Vasquez (2000) and Schneider,
Barbieri and Gleditsch (2003).
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care about the same rival goods and resources. The analysis leads to a testable prediction: the
probability of conict over rival goods between two societies should be inversely related to their
genetic distance. In Section 4, we show that the empirical evidence on international conict strongly
supports this prediction. Finally, we discuss how the e¤ect of relatedness on conict would change
if the dispute were about control of goods that are non-rival in consumption (public goods).
2.1 Relatedness and the Transmission of Preferences
We rst present a simple model of the intergenerational transmission of preferences over the very
long run. Consider three periods (o for origin, p for prehistory, and h for history). In period o
there exists only one population (population 0). In period p the original population splits into two
populations (1 and 2). In period h each of the two populations splits into two separate populations
again (population 1 into 1:1 and 1:2, and population 2 into 2:1 and 2:2), as displayed in Figure 1.
In this setting, the genetic distance dg(i; j) between population i and population j can be simply
measured by the number of periods since they were one population:
dg(1:1; 1:2) = dg(2:1; 2:2) = 1 (1)
and
dg(1:1 ; 2:1) = dg(1:1 ; 2:2) = dg(1:2 ; 2:1) = dg(1:2 ; 2:2) = 2 (2)
These numbers have an intuitive interpretation: populations 1.1 and 1.2 are sibling populations,
sharing a common parent ancestor (population 1), while populations 2.1 and 2.2 are also sibling
populations, sharing a di¤erent common parent ancestor (population 2). In contrast, populations
1.1 and 2.1, for example, are cousin populations sharing a common grand-parent ancestor (popu-
lation 0).
For simplicity, preferences are summarized by two types (A and B). At time o, the ancestral
population 0 is either of type A or of type B. For analytical convenience and without loss of
generality, we assume that population 0 is of type A with probability 1=2 and of type B with
probability 1=2.9 Populations inherit preferences from their ancestors with variation - a population
i0 descending from a population i will have preferences of the same type as their parent population
i with probability , and of the other type with probability 1  .
9The qualitative results would not change if we were to assume that the ancestral population is of type A with
probability 100% or of type B with probability 100%.
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We capture the fact that populations inherit preferences from their ancestors by assuming
 > 1=2 and the fact that there is variation (inheritance is not perfect) by assuming  < 1.10 Then,
on average, populations at a smaller genetic distance from each other will tend to be more similar
in preferences. For instance, the probability that two sibling populations (e.g., 1.1 and 1.2) have
identical types is
F () = 2 + (1  )2 (3)
while the probability that two cousin populations (e.g., 1.1 and 2.1) have identical types is
G() = 4 + 62(1  )2 + (1  )4 (4)
It can be easily shown that11
F () > G() for
1
2
<  < 1 (5)
which implies:
Proposition 1
The probability that two populations are of the same type is decreasing in genetic distance.
This result plays a key role in our analysis of conict below.
10At  = 1=2, each population would have equal chances of being of either type, independently of the parent
populations type, while at  = 1; each population would be of the same type as their ancestors with 100% probability.
11By dividing both F () and G() by  and rearranging terms, the inequality F ()   G() > 0 can be re-written
equivalently as
2  10+ 162   83  f() > 0
It is immediate to verify that the above inequality holds, given that f( 1
2
) = f(1) = 0 and the derivative
f 0() = 2( 5 + 16  122)
is strictly positive for 1=2 <  < 5=6; zero at  = 5=6, and negative for 5=6 <   1.
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2.2 Conict
Consider two populations (i and j), each forming a sovereign state.12 Suppose that sovereign state
i is in control of a valuable prize of type t, from which it obtains the following benets bi:
bi = (1  jt  ti j)R (6)
where ti denotes state is ideal type, and R > 0 is the size of the prize. If the prize is of type A,
t = tA; and if it is of type B, t = tB. Without loss of generality, we assume that the prize is of
type A with probability 1=2 and of type B with probability 1=2. State is ideal type is also equal
to either tA or tB. We assume that the state benets from controlling the prize even if it is not of
its favored type, that is
jtA   tBj < 1 (7)
The prize can be interpreted as any valuable good which can be controlled by a sovereign state
- e.g. natural resources, land, cities, trade routes, colonies, protectorates, etc. (we return to the
interpretation of the model below, when we discuss possible extensions). Sovereign state j also
values the prize, and would gain positive benets if it could control the prize. State js benets
bjfrom controlling the prize are
bj = (1  jt  tj j)R (8)
State j can try to obtain control over the prize by challenging state i - that is, state j can take
two actions: "challenge" state i (C) or "not challenge" (NC). If state j chooses action NC, state
i keeps full control over the prize, and obtains a net utility equal to bi, while state j obtains net
benets equal to zero. If state j challenges state i for the possession of the prize, state i can respond
either with "ght" (F ) or "not ght" (NF ). If state i does not ght, state j obtains control of the
prize, and net benets equal to bj , while state i obtains net benets equal to zero.
If state i decides to ght in response to the challenge, a war takes place.13 When a war occurs
12For simplicity, we assume that each state is a unied agent, formed by one population with homogeneous pref-
erences. In our model, we abstract from the possibility that states may include mixed populations with di¤erent
preferences. However, for the empirical analysis we take into account population heterogeneity within states when
computing genetic distance. In this theoretical analysis we also abstract from the possibility that the state may be
controlled by a non-democratic Leviathan that pursues objectives di¤erent from those of the whole population. In
the empirical section we control for measures of democracy.
13 In the Appendix (A.1) we present an extension in which peaceful bargaining is possible, in alternative to war,
when state j challenges and state i responds to the challenge.
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(i.e., when actions fC;Fg are taken), the probability that state i wins, denoted by i, is a function
of the two statesrelative military capabilities (denoted respectively by Mi and Mj):14
i =
Mi
Mi +Mj
(9)
while the probability that state j wins the war is obviously 1  i. Ex ante, each state obtains an
expected utility respectively given by
Ui = ibi   ci (10)
Uj = (1  i)bj   cj (11)
where ci > 0 and cj > 0 denote the respective costs of going to war. The extensive form of the
game is illustrated in Figure 2.
It is immediate to show that:
Lemma
War is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if and only if minfUi; Ujg  0: War is the unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium when minfUi; Ujg > 0.15
2.3 War and Relatedness
We now investigate how similarity in preferences between the two states a¤ect the probability of
war. To simplify the analysis, we assume equal capabilities (Mi =Mj =M) and costs (ci = cj = c).
Let P (i; j) denote the probability of a war between state i and state j.
14This is an instance of "ratio" contest success function. In general, the literature on the technology of conict
assumes that the probability of success is a function of either the ratio or the di¤erence between military capabilities
(for a general discussion, see Garnkel and Skaperdas, 2007). The choice of specication in this paper is inconsequen-
tial because we treat military capabilities as exogenous. A straighforward extension would be to endogenize military
capabilities. The extension could strengthen the link between relatedness and probability of conict, insofar as states
with similar preferences might face more similar incentives to invest in military capabilities, all other things being
equal. We do not pursue the extension here, but we control for di¤erences in military capabilities in the empirical
section.
15When Ui > 0 and Uj = 0, two sub-game perfect equilibria exist: fC;Fg and fNC;Fg. When Ui = 0 and Uj > 0,
there are also two sub-game perfect equilibria: fC;Fg and fC;NFg. When Ui = Uj = 0, three equilibria may occur:
fC;Fg, fC;NFg and fNC;Fg: When minfUi; Ujg < 0 the only sub-game perfect equilibria are peaceful. If Ui < 0,
the only subgame perfect equilibrium is fC;NFg. If Ui > 0 and Uj < 0; the only sub-game perfect equilibrium is
fNC;Fg. Finally, when Ui = 0, and Uj < 0 there are two (peaceful) equilibria: fNC;Fg and fC;NFg:
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Clearly, a war would never occur (P (i; j) = 0) if each states expected utility from going to war
is negative even when the prize is of its preferred type. This would happen at a very high cost of
war:
c >
1
2
R (12)
In contrast, a war would always occur (P (i; j) = 1) if each states expected utility from going to
war is positive even when the resource is not of its favored type. This would happen at a very low
cost of war:
c <
1
2
R(1  jtA   tBj) (13)
Therefore, we will focus on the more interesting case when war may occur with probability between
0 and 1 (0 < P (i; j) < 1), which happens when the cost of war takes on an intermediate value16:
1
2
R(1  jtA   tBj) < c < 1
2
R (14)
Under these assumptions, a war will occur if and only if the two states have the same preferred
type, and that type is equal to the type of the prize under dispute - that is, ti = t

j = t. If the two
states had always identical preferences, the probability of a war would be 1=2.17 In contrast, if the
preferences of each state were independently distributed, with each state having a 50% chance of
preferring type A to type B (and vice versa), the probability of war would be 1=4.18
In general, for 1=2 <  < 1, the expected probability of war between states i and j would
depend on the degree of relatedness (genetic distance) of their populations. For two states i and
j with dg(i; j) = 1 - i.e., states formed by sibling populations - the probability that both states
type is the same as the prize under dispute is half the probability that both states have the same
preferences, that is
Pfi; j j dg(i; j) = 1g = F ()
2
=
2 + (1  )2
2
(15)
By the same token, for states such that dg(i; j) = 2 - i.e., states formed by cousin populations -,
the probability that both statestype is equal to the type of the prize is
Pfi; j j dg(i; j) = 2g = G()
2
=
4 + 62(1  )2 + (1  )4
2
(16)
16To simplify the analysis, we do not consider the knife-edge cases c = 1
2
R and c = 1
2
R(1   jtA   tB j), when its
possible that minfUi; Ujg = 0, implying that one or both states may be indi¤erent between war and peace, and
multiple equilibria may trivially occur, as detailed in the footnote to the Lemma.
17This would occur, for instance, if preferences were transmitted without variation across generations:  = 1:
18This would occur, for instance, if preferences were transmitted purely randomly across generations:  = 1=2:
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As already shown in the previous section, F () > G() for all 1=2 <  < 1: Therefore, it immedi-
ately follows that
Pfi; jjdg(i; j) = 1g > Pfi; j j dg(i; j) = 2g (17)
which we can summarize as our main result:
Proposition 2
States with more closely related populations (smaller genetic distance) are more likely to go to
war with each other.
An illustration of the model can be provided with a simple spatial example. Assume that space
is unidimensional. Three states divide the territory among themselves as in Figure 3, with the
border between state i and state j at point x, and the border between state j and state i0 at point
y. Assume that state i and state j are of type A, and state i0 is of type B. The parameters are
such that equation (14) is satised. Now, consider the territory between x0 and x. If that territory
is of type B, state j will not challenge state i for its possession, but if that territory is of type A,
a war will occur. In contrast, consider the territory between y and y0. If that territory is of type
B, state j will not challenge state i0 for its possession, while if it is of type A, state j will challenge
state i0, and state i0 will surrender it peacefully. In either case, no conict will occur.
This example illustrates how the probability of conict between states in similar geographical
settings varies because of preferences over the prize: states with more similar preferences are
more likely to go to war with each other, other things being equal. In this example, the prize
is a contiguous territory, but similar e¤ects would hold for control over non-contiguous territories
(colonies, protectorates, ports and harbors along trade routes), or over other rival issues about
which states may care with di¤erent intensities (for instance, monopoly rights over trade, shing or
other valuable sources of income in specic waters or regions). History is abundant with examples
of populations that fought over specic rival goods (territories, cities, religious sites) because they
shared a common history and common preferences, inherited with variation from their ancestors.
For instance, genetically close populations (Jews and Arabs) who share similar preferences over
Jerusalem have fought and continue to ght over the control of that rival good. In general, we
can expect that populations may share more similar preferences over specic types of land and
resources because they have inherited similar tastes and demand functions (as in the example
about Jerusalem), or because they have inherited similar technologies and methods of production,
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or both.19 Preferences for specic rival goods can be inherited culturally or biologically, or as a
result of dual inheritance (gene-culture coevolution) - for example, those populations who inherited
the gene mutation allowing the digestion of milk by adults, along with the ability to domesticate and
exploit milk-producing animals, historically might have cared much more about cows and pastures
- and fought over them - than populations who did not share those inherited traits.20
2.4 Conict over Public Goods
In our basic model the prize is a rival and excludable good: either one or the other state obtains
full control, and the population in the state without control receives no net benet. How would
our results change if the prize were a public good (non-rival and non-excludable in consumption)?
Then, state j would obtain some external benets when state i is in control of the good, and vice
versa. In itself, this extension would only reduce the likelihood of war, because the externalities
would reduce the gap in utility between controlling and not controlling the good.
However, the implications would change dramatically if we also allowed the state in control
to select the characteristics or type of the public good. As we show formally in Appendix A.2
this modication reverses the main result of our basic model.21 The intuition is straightforward:
Suppose conict is not about control of the public good per se, but about determination of its type.
Then, more closely related populations, sharing more similar preferences about the characteristics
of the public good, are less likely to engage in conict. In contrast, populations that are historically
and culturally more distant tend to disagree more over the type of public good. Therefore, similarity
in preferences over public goods could partly or totally o¤set the e¤ects of similarity in preferences
over rival goods, depending on whether the conict is mostly about rival goods or public goods.
Conicts over public goods are more likely to emerge among groups that belong to the same
19 In principle, similarities in technology could a¤ect the probability of conict not only by a¤ecting preferences over
rival goods, but also, more directly, by a¤ecting military capabilities (more similar populations may be more similar
in military technologies and hence capabilities, other things being equal). As already mentioned, in the empirical
section we control for di¤erences in military capabilities, and continue to nd an e¤ect of genetic distance on conict.
In any case, we nd that di¤erences in measured capabilities are not correlated with genetic distance in the data.
20For a discussion of inheritance mechanisms (biological, cultural and dual) and their relevance for economic and
politial outcomes see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2012).
21A generalization of the framework that encompasses both models (conict over pure rival goods and conict over
pure public goods) as special cases is presented in Appendix A.3.
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political jurisdictions and therefore share non-rival and non-excludable goods and policies by insti-
tutional design.22 Therefore, conict over public goods and policies is likely to play an important
role in many (but not all) civil conicts. This observation is consistent with theoretical and empiri-
cal work associating ethnic polarization, a measure that captures distance between groups within a
country, with conict over public goods. Of particular note is a recent empirical study of ethnicity
and intrastate conict by Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012), building on theoretical work by Es-
teban and Ray (2011). They use measures of ethnolinguistic polarization using linguistic distance
between groups, and nd empirically that linguistic polarization increases intrastate conict over
public goods.23 Such e¤ects of distance and polarization, albeit linguistic rather than genetic, are
entirely consistent with our hypothesis that less closely related groups are more likely to ght over
the control of public goods.24
In contrast to the case of civil conict, the importance of this public-goods e¤ect is likely to
be much lower for interstate conict. Even though disagreements about the provision of public
goods and policies may also emerge among sovereign states (i.e., how to ght international terrorist
threats, global climate change, or nancial instability), historically interstate militarized conicts
have been mostly about control of rival and excludable goods, such as territories, cities, and natural
resources. In our empirical analysis we focus on the determinants of interstate conict, where the
basic model is likely to capture the main forces at work, leaving the study of the more complex
links between relatedness and civil conict for further research.
22See Alesina and Spolaore (1997) for a discussion of the relation between diversity of preferences over public
goods and the costs of forming more heterogeneous states, and Desmet et al. (2011) for an analysis linking such
heterogeneity costs to historical relatedness between populations. See also Spolaore (2008, 2012) for formal analyses
of conict in that context.
23Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) use measures of linguistic distance, based on those in Fearon (2003) and
Desmet, Ortuño-Ortíz and Wacziarg (2012).
24The theory in Esteban and Ray (2011) and Esteban, Mayoral and Ray (2012) also draws a distinction between
public goods and private goods. In their framework, a central role is played by three indices, measuring polarization,
fractionalization and cohesion. The weight of these indices in explaining conict intensity depends on the particular
nature of each conict: when group cohesion is high, ethnic polarization increases conict if the prize is public and
fractionalization increases conict if the prize is private. Our analysis and results are quite di¤erent from theirs. Our
focus is on the e¤ects of relatedness between populations, not on polarization and fractionalization within societies.
More importantly, while our model predicts a positive e¤ect of genetic distance on conict over public goods, consistent
with their results on polarization, our model also predict a negative e¤ect of distance on conict over private goods.
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3 Data and Methodology
Our model predicts that the degree of relatedness between populations has a positive e¤ect on their
conict propensities. In the remainder of this paper we examine empirically the determinants of
bilateral conict across states, focusing on the degree of relatedness between the populations of each
pair of countries. We control for other determinants of bilateral conict, in particular numerous
measures of geographic distance.
3.1 Measuring Conict
We use panel data on interstate conict between 1816 and 2001 from the Correlates of War Project
(www.correlatesofwar.org).25 We start from a discrete indicator of the intensity of a bilateral
conict between countries i and j in year t. In any given year, the indicator takes on a value
from 0 for no militarized conict to 5 for an interstate war involving more than 1; 000 total battle
deaths. Following the convention in the literature, we dene a dummy variable Cijt equal to 1 if
the intensity of militarized conict is equal to or greater than 3, zero otherwise. Since our main
independent variable is time-invariant, our focus is mainly on cross-sectional. Thus, we look for
pairs that were ever involved in a conict (Cijt = 1 for some t) over the time period 1816-2001:
the pair is coded as having experienced a conict during this period if there was a conict in at
least one year. Our main dependent variable of interest is this binary indicator of conict, denoted
Cij . We separately examine the determinants of the maximal intensity of conict, as well as the
determinants of full-blown war (corresponding to a pair having ever experienced a conict intensity
equal to 5). We also separately conduct an analysis of the determinants of Cijt, i.e. exploiting the
time dimension, in order to control for time-varying factors a¤ecting conict propensities.
3.2 Measuring Relatedness
To capture genealogical relatedness, we use genetic distance. Since the interpretation and con-
struction of this measure was discussed in detail in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), we provide a
shorter description here. Genetic distance is a summary measure of di¤erences in allele frequencies
across a range of neutral genes (or chromosomal loci). The measure we use, FST genetic distance,
captures the length of time since two populations became separated from each other. When two
25See Jones et. al. (1996) and Faten et al. (2004) for details concerning the coding of bilateral militarized disputes
in the Correlates of War database.
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populations split apart, random genetic mutations result in genetic di¤erentiation over time. The
longer the separation time, the greater the genetic distance computed from a set of neutral genes.
In other words, FST genetic distance is a direct measure of genealogical relatedness, resulting from
a molecular clock. The specic source for our data is Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), pp. 75-76.26
Our focus is on a set of 42 world populations for which there is data on bilateral genetic distance,
computed from 120 neutral alleles. Among the set of 42 world populations, the maximum genetic
distance is between Mbuti Pygmies and Papua New-Guineans (FST = 0:4573), and the minimum
is between the Danish and the English (FST = 0:0021). The mean genetic distance among the 861
available pairs is 0:1338.
While the data on genetic distance is available at the level of populations, the rest of our
data is at the country-pair level. It was therefore necessary to match genetic groups to countries.
The procedure to match populations to countries is described in detail in Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009). To summarize, each of the 42 groups was matched to almost all of the 1; 120 ethnic groups
in Alesina et al. (2003). The same source provides the distribution of these ethnic groups across
virtually all the countries in the world. Thus, we could construct measures of genetic distance
between countries, rather than groups. We constructed two such measures. The rst was the
distance between the plurality ethnic groups of each country in a pair, i.e. the groups with the
largest shares of each countrys population. The second was a measure of weighted genetic distance,
constructed as follows: assume that country i is composed of populations m = 1:::M and country
j is composed of populations n = 1:::N .27 Denote by s1m the share of population m in country i
(similarly for country j) and dmn the genetic distance between populations m and n. The weighted
FST genetic distance between countries i and j is then:
FSTWij =
MX
m=1
NX
n=1
(sim  sjn  dmn) (18)
where skm is the share of group m in country k, dmn is the FST genetic distance between groups
26Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) also provide data on Nei genetic distance, a measure that is di¤erent but highly
correlated with FST distance. Our results are robust to using Nei distance rather than FST distance. Corresponding
estimates are available upon request.
27That is, we do not treat countries formed by di¤erent ethnic groups as a new population, in a genetic sense,
but as a set of separate populations. This is consistent with the idea that di¤erent groups have inherited di¤erent
traits and preferences from their ancestors, and that the countrys traits and preferences are a weighted average of
the traits and preferences inherited by the di¤erent groups.
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m and n. This measure represents the expected genetic distance between two randomly selected
individuals, one from each country. Weighted genetic distance is very highly correlated with genetic
distance based on plurality groups (the correlation is 93:2%), so for practical purposes it does not
make a big di¤erence which one we use. We will use the weighted FST distance as the baseline
measure throughout this study, as it is a more precise measure of average genetic distance between
countries.28
The match of populations to countries pertains to the contemporary period, after the great
migrations that followed the conquest of the New World. Hence, for instance, for the current
period the plurality population in Australia is the English population. To address bias resulting
from errors in matching populations to countries for the current period, as well as concerns that
current genetic distance may be endogenous with respect to past wars, we also matched countries to
their 1500 AD populations. For instance, for 1500 Australia is matched to the Australian Aborigines
rather than the English. Genetic distance between countries using the 1500 match can be used as
an instrument for current genetic distance.29
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 and 2 provide basic statistics that give a general sense of the data and provide clues
concerning the relationship between conict and relatedness. The statistics pertain to a baseline
sample of 13; 575 country pairs, based on 176 underlying countries. The underlying data is an
unbalanced panel of 517; 251 observations with yearly observations from 1816 to 2001, but for the
purposes of summary statistics the panel has been collapsed into a cross-section.30 Table 1, Panel
A provides means and standard deviations. Conict is a relatively rare phenomenon, as only 5:6%
of country pairs ever experienced a conict between 1816 and 2001; war is even more rare, with
an incidence of 2:1%. Panel B provides pairwise correlations between the main variables in the
28Our results are robust to using genetic distance between plurality groups rather than weighted genetic distance.
The corresponding estimates are available upon request.
29Since we do not have detailed data on ethnic composition going back to 1500, the corresponding match only
refers to plurality groups. Matching countries to populations for 1500 is more straightforward than for the current
period, since Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) attempted to sample populations as they were in 1500. This likely reduces
the extent of measurement error. The correlation between weighted genetic distance matched using current period
populations and genetic distance between plurality groups as of 1500 is 0:723 in our baseline sample.
30Summary statistics computed from the uncollapsed panel (i.e. using Cijt instead of Cij as the measure of conict)
give a message similar to the cross-sectional ones, and are available upon request.
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analysis. We observe a negative correlation between genetic distance and both conicts and wars,
and the other correlations are of the expected size and magnitude.
Table 2 shows the conditional frequency of both wars and conicts, conrming that wars are
rare occurrences, as only 275 country pairs have ever experienced full-blown wars between 1816
and 2001, out of 13; 175 pairs. Almost 28% of these wars occurred between countries in the bottom
decile of genetic distance, and almost 54% of all wars occurred in pairs in the bottom quartile.
Only 10 wars were observed in pairs in the top quartile, of which 7 involved South Africa as one
of the combatants. While South Africa is characterized in our data as genetically distant from
European populations due to the large African majority there, a historical examination of wars
involving South Africa reveals that the wars were spurred mainly by conicts over issues separating
European powers and South Africas European power elite. Thus, in this instance genetic distance
is computed in a way that works against nding a positive link between relatedness and conict.
In sum, countries that are very genetically distant almost never went to war with each other in our
sample. The same statements hold when conditioning on measures of geographic distance, as is
also done in Table 2: even wars occurring across large geographic distances typically involve mostly
genetically similar participants. For instance it is still the case that over half of the wars occurring
between non-contiguous countries involved country pairs in the bottom quartile of genetic distance.
Similar observations hold when we consider more broadly militarized conicts rather than wars
per se: while there are vastly more pairs that were ever involved in such conicts (744 versus
275), the relative frequency by quartile of genetic distance is roughly preserved. Similarly, the
proportions do not change very much when conditioning on geographic distance being large between
the countries in a pair - countries not sharing a common sea or ocean, non-contiguous countries, or
countries that are more than 1; 000 kilometers apart. Thus, Table 2 provides suggestive evidence
that relatedness and conict are positively related, but to examine this hypothesis more formally
we turn to regression analysis.
3.4 Empirical Specication
A more formal regression setup allows us to control for various determinants of interstate militarized
conicts, in particular a range of geographic distance metrics. As a starting point for our empirical
specication, we follow the practice in the existing literature (for instance Bremer, 1992, Martin,
Mayer and Thoenig, 2008), regressing a binary indicator of interstate conict on a set of bilateral
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determinants.
We consider two baseline methodologies. The main methodology we focus on is cross-sectional:
we collapse the panel into a single cross-section where the dependent variable is the already dened
indicator of whether a pair was ever in an interstate conict between 1816 and 2001. Since our
main independent variable of interest, FST genetic distance, is time invariant at the horizon of
this study, it is a natural starting point to consider the determinants of whether a country ever
had a conict or a war over the 1816 to 2001 time period. The baseline cross-sectional regression
specication is:
Cij = 1Xij + 2FST
W
ij + ij (19)
where the vector Xij contains a series of time invariant controls such as a contiguity dummy, log
geodesic distance, log longitudinal and latitudinal distance, several other indicators of geographic
isolation, and dummy variables indicating whether the countries in a pair were ever part of the
same polity and were ever in a colonial relationship.
The second methodology is to make full use of the panel dimension. This allows us to control for
time varying determinants of conict, some of which (democracy, trade, income di¤erences, among
others) are important control variables that have given rise to important strands of the literature
on the determinants of international conict. The baseline panel specication is:
Cijt = 1Xijt + 2FST
W
ij + "ijt (20)
where Xijt contains all of the aforementioned geographic and colonial controls plus time varying
measures such as a dummy variable representing whether both countries in the pair are democracies,
whether they belong to an active military alliance, how many years they have been at peace with
each other, and the number of other wars occurring in year t. The choice of controls in Xijt
closely follows the existing literature, particularly the contribution of Martin, Mayer and Thoenig
(2008). A major di¤erence is that we greatly augment the list of geographic controls compared
to existing contributions, in an e¤ort to identify separately the e¤ects of geographic proximity
from those of genealogical relatedness. It is important for our purposes to adequately control
for geographic isolation as genetic distance and geographic isolation tend to be correlated (for
instance the correlation between FST genetic distance and log geodesic distance in our baseline
sample is 0:434). It is important to note, however, that the correlation between genetic distance
and geographic distance is far from perfect. In particular, the massive populations movements
19
that followed the discovery of the New World (both due to the European conquests and to the
slave trade) have served to greatly reduce the correlation between genetic distance and geographic
distance.
Equations (19) and (20) are estimated using probit. For the panel specication, we cluster
standard errors at the country-pair level. Throughout, we report marginal e¤ects evaluated at the
mean of the independent variables, and report the standardized magnitude of the e¤ect of genetic
distance (the e¤ect of a one standard deviation change in genetic distance as a percentage of the
mean probability of conict). Because the proportion of pair-year observations with conicts is
small, in order to improve the readability of the marginal e¤ects we multiplied all of them by 100
in all tables. The proper interpretation of the estimates displayed in the tables, then, is as the
marginal e¤ect of each variable on the probability of conict in percentage points.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Baseline Cross-Sectional Estimates
Table 3 presents baseline estimates of the coe¢ cients in equation (19). We start with a univariate
regression (column 1), showing a very strong negative relationship between genetic distance and the
incidence of militarized conict. The magnitude of this e¤ect is large, as a one standard deviation
change in genetic distance (0:068) is associated with a 68:81% decline in the percentage probability
of to countries ever having experienced a conict (in the cross-section, that baseline probability is
5:65% for the entire period between 1816 and 2001). Obviously, this estimate is tainted by omitted
variables bias, stemming mainly from the omission of geographic factors.
Column (2) introduces eight measures of geographic distance, plus two measures of colonial
past.31 The choice of the geographic controls was motivated by the goal of controlling for dimensions
of geographic distance that constitute barriers to militarized conict. Contiguity is an obvious
example, since two contiguous countries do not have to project force very far in order to ght
each other, and might have adjacent territories under dispute. Access to a common sea or ocean
facilitates conict through the projection of a naval force. Geodesic distance, on the other hand,
31We also included various measures of climatic similarity within country pairs, using Koppen-Geiger codings of
climate. The idea was that similar countries might seek to conquer countries with similar geographies. The inclusion
of these variables did not lead to discernible changes in the e¤ect of genetic distance (results are available upon
request).
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limits the ability to project force. A landlocked country may be harder to attack by a non-contiguous
neighbor, since its armies would have to cross another country rst. Finally, islands could be either
more or less prone to conict depending on whether surrounding seas a¤ord protection from attack,
whether this protection raises an islands propensity to attack others, or whether an island is easier
to reach via naval projection of force (we nd, in fact, that pairs composed of islands are more
prone to conict). Empirically, these measures usually bear the expected signs (more distance, less
conict), and their inclusion reduces the e¤ect of genetic distance.32 However, this e¤ect remains
negative and highly signicant statistically. Its magnitude is substantial - a one standard deviation
increase in genetic distance is associated with a reduction in the probability of conict of 23:84%
of that variables mean.
In column 3, we address the possible endogeneity of genetic distance. There are two main
issues. The rst issue is measurement error stemming from imperfect matches of genetic groups
to current populations and countries, leading to probable attenuation bias. The second issue is
reverse causality. To the extent that past conquests triggered movements of populations between
countries, and to the extent that past conicts are conducive to a higher propensity for current
conict, country pairs could have a lower genetic distance because of their high (past and present)
propensity to enter into militarized conicts. This would lead to an upward bias (in absolute value)
in estimates of the e¤ect of genetic distance. However, population geneticists have noted that a very
high degree of admixture from migration or conquest would be required in order to signicantly
a¤ect a countrys genetic distance to others (Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, and Piazza, 1994).33
To address endogeneity and measurement error, we instrument for modern genetic distance
using genetic distance between populations as they were in 1500. Genetic distance in 1500 is
unlikely to be causally a¤ected by conicts between 1816 and 2001. Moreover, matching countries
32Proceeding sequentially, we found that adding these controls one by one progressively reduced the e¤ect of genetic
distance, but that after adding four controls the estimated probit marginal e¤ect of genetic distance stabilized around
20. The order did not matter much. The largest reductions in the coe¢ cient on genetic distance were found for
contiguity, log geodesic distance, the landlocked dummy and the log product of land area, after which additional
controls did not meaningfully reduce the e¤ect of genetic distance. This gives us some condence that we are
adequately controlling for geographic impediments to conict.
33For instance, Opennheimer (2006) argues that the genetic composition of the English population is dominated
by that of the populations, from the Iberic Peninsula and Central Europe, that populated the British Isles after the
end of the Ice Age. Subsequent major invasions, from the Romans, the Anglo-Saxons, the Normans, etc., contributed
very little to the English gene pool: the genetic composition of the English was basically settled 3,000 years ago.
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to genetic groups is much more straightforward for 1500 for two reasons. First, Cavalli-Sforza et
al. (1994) explicitly collected data for populations as they were around 1500 (that is, they took
care to sample only direct descendants of aboriginal populations that had lived continuously at
that location since 1500, not people whose ancestors had moved to the current location after the
great migrations post-1500). Second, matching genetic groups to countries is easier for the period
predating the great migrations that followed the discovery of the New World, because there is no
need to track the Old World origin of current New World populations.
The results using IV reinforce those previously reported. Interestingly, the standardized e¤ect of
genetic distance rises by over 50% - to 36:79% - relative to the estimates of column (2), suggesting
that the latter understated the e¤ect. The higher e¤ect of genetic distance under IV is likely
to reect lower prevalence of measurement error, since arguments about reverse causality would
suggest that instrumenting should reduce the e¤ect of genetic distance. To adopt a conservative
approach, in the rest of the analysis we will provide estimates mostly without instrumenting, keeping
in mind that non-instrumented probit estimates of the e¤ect of genetic distance are possibly an
understatement of its true magnitude.
The remaining columns of Table 3 consider the determinants of wars rather than conicts more
broadly (columns 4 and 5). We redene the dependent variable as a binary indicator of war,
i.e. a dummy variable equal to one if the pair ever experienced a conict of intensity equal to 5
(corresponding to conicts with more than 1; 000 total battle deaths), over the sample period. Only
2:09% of the country pairs in our sample ever experienced a full-blown war, so-dened, between 1816
and 2001. Again, genetic distance reduces the propensity for war in a statistically signicant way:
a standard deviation increase in genetic distance reduces the probability of ever having experienced
a war by 20:57% of this variables mean, an e¤ect comparable to that for conict more broadly.
As before, the standardized magnitude of the e¤ect rises (here by about 40%) when instrumenting
with genetic distance as of 1500.34
34Additionally, we examined whether the e¤ect of genetic distance di¤ers by type of conict, exploiting information
available in the COW database on the type of dispute. Non-territorial issues include a desire to change the other
countrys regime or to change the other countrys policies (Vasquez and Henehan, 2001). We dened a territorial
conict as one for which either country seeks a territorial revision either as the most or second most important
rationale for the dispute. We found that the e¤ect of genetic distance was negative and statistically signicant for
both territorial and non-terrorial conicts. These empirical results are available upon request.
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4.2 Estimates Across Time and Space
To examine if the negative e¤ect of relatedness on conict across various geographic locations, we
break down the sample across space, by continent. The goal is in part to establish whether the
overall result might be driven by a specic continent. Additionally, the fact that many conicts
occur within continents might be driving the negative e¤ects of relatedness in the worldwide sam-
ple, since intracontinental genetic distance is typically much smaller than cross-continental genetic
distance. Finally, geographic barriers to conict across continents are much larger than within
continents, so looking for within-continent e¤ects of genetic distance on conict propensities is a
way to further address the possibly confounding e¤ects of geographic factors. To do so, we isolate
pairs of countries that belonged to the same continent - dened as Europe, Asia, Africa and the
Americas, and examine the determinants of conicts among those pairs separately.35 The results
appear in Table 4.
We nd a negative e¤ect of genetic distance on conict within every continent, with signicant
e¤ects at the 1% level for Europe and at the 5% level for the Americas (while negative and quite
large, the e¤ect for Asia was only signicant at the 14% level). For Europe (column 2), we have
the advantage of observing a separate, more detailed matrix of FST genetic distance.36 The results
are particularly striking in this subsample: despite the paucity of observations (only 291 country
pairs), the e¤ect of genetic distance remains negative and signicant at the 1% level, and its
standardized magnitude (38:4%) is over 60% larger than in the worldwide sample (23:8%). The
result is signicant because European countries are geographically very connected, either by land
or sea, so genetic distance is unlikely to capture geographic impediments to conict. Moreover,
genetic distance in Europe results from much more recent population divisions, and is thus much
smaller in magnitude than genetic distance in the worldwide sample. To be able to identify a large
positive e¤ect of relatedness on conict propensities among populations that are closely related
35 In our baseline sample of 13; 175 pairs, the number of pairs having experienced intracontinental interstate conicts
between 1816 and 2001 is 112 in Asia (out of 866 pairs), 75 in Africa (out of 1; 048 pairs), 68 in the Americas (out
of 581 pairs) and 71 in Europe (out of 291 pairs). There were no conicts among the 27 country pairs located in
Oceania.
36Estimates using the European matrix, where there are 26 distinct genetic groups, are based on more precise
measures compared to the worldwide sample, as detailed in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). More extensive estimation
results focusing on Europe, showing the robustness of the e¤ect of genetic distance to the inclusion of additional
microgeography controls and sample splits by time periods, are available upon request.
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historically reinforces the robustness of our main result.
The strong e¤ects found within Europe raise the possibility that the worldwide results are
driven by Europe. To address this possibility, we isolate every pair of countries that did not involve
at least one European country. Results are presented in column (3) of Table 4. We nd that,
while slightly smaller in magnitude than for the full sample, the negative e¤ect of genetic distance
remains large and statistically signicant. Thus, our worldwide results were not driven only by
conicts involving European countries. Overall, the regional breakdown suggests that the negative
e¤ect of relatedness on war is remarkably consistent across space.
We next examine whether relatedness a¤ects conict di¤erently across time. To do so, we dene
dummy variables for whether a country pair was ever at war during a specic subperiod.37 Results
are presented in Table 5. We nd again that the estimated e¤ect of genetic distance is remarkably
robust across time periods: it remains negative, large and signicant whether considering the pre-
or post-1900 periods, suggesting that our ndings are not driven by 20th century, in particular
the two World Wars. Focusing on the 20th century, the e¤ect is unchanged for the post-1946
period, compared to the 1816-2001 baseline. In other words, our nding is not simply an artifact
of the Second World War, which pitted a lot of European populations against each other. In fact,
our nding holds strongly even after the end of the Cold War (column 6), despite the relatively
small number of pairs involved in conicts during this period (only 218). The e¤ect of genetic
distance is negative and statistically signicant whatever the subperiod under consideration, and
the magnitude is large particularly for the subperiods spanning the 20th Century.
4.3 Adding Linguistic and Religious Distance
While genetic distance is a precise and continuous measure of the degree of relatedness between
populations and countries, other measures exist. The existing literature on interstate conict has
examined linguistic and religious ties in an e¤ort to tell apart primordialist theories of conict from
instrumentalist theories (Richardson, 1960, Henderson, 1997). Thus, it is important to evaluate
whether these variables trump genetic distance, and more generally how their inclusion a¤ects our
main coe¢ cient of interest. Linguistic relatedness is associated with genetic relatedness because,
37These subperiods, and the corresponding number of pairs that were involved in conict during those subperiods,
were: 1816-1900 (106 pairs in conict), 1901-2001 (721 pairs in conict), 1946-2001 (536 pairs in conict), 1919-1989
(585 pairs in conict), 1990-2001 (218 pairs in conict).
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like genes, languages are transmitted intergenerationally: populations speaking similar languages
are likely to be more related than linguistically distinct populations (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1994).38
Religious beliefs, also transmitted intergenerationally, are one type of human traits that can a¤ect
conict. In what follows, we evaluate whether the e¤ect of genetic distance is reduced or elimi-
nated when controlling for linguistic and religious distance, and whether these variables have an
independent e¤ect on the incidence of interstate conict.
Prior to discussing the results, we describe how these measures were constructed. To capture
linguistic distance, we use the data and approach in Fearon (2003), making use of linguistic trees
from Ethnologue to compute the number of common linguistic nodes between languages in the
world, a measure of their linguistic similarity (the linguistic tree in this dataset involves up to
15 nested classications, so two countries with populations speaking the same language will share
15 common nodes).39 Using data on the distribution of each linguistic group within and across
countries, from the same source, we compute a measure of the number of common nodes shared by
languages spoken by plurality groups within each country in a pair. We also compute a weighted
measure of linguistic similarity, representing the expected number of common linguistic nodes
between two randomly chosen individuals, one from each country in a pair (the formula is analogous
to that of equation 18).40 Following Fearon (2003), we transform these measures so that they reect
38On the other hand, there are many reasons why genetic and linguistic distance are imperfectly correlated. Rates
of genetic and linguistic mutations may di¤er; populations of a certain genetic make-up may adopt a foreign language
as the result of foreign rule, as happened when the Magyar rulers imposed their language in Hungary. Other salient
examples include countries colonized by European powers, adopting their language (English, French, Portuguese or
Spanish), while maintaining very distinct populations genetically. See Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) for an extensive
discussion of these points.
39As an alternative, we used a separate measure of linguistic distance, based on lexicostatistics, from Dyen, Kruskal
and Black (1992). This is a more continuous measure than the one based on common nodes, but it is only available
for countries speaking Indo-European languages. It captures the number of common meanings, out of a list of 200,
that are conveyed using "cognate" or related words. Summing over the 200 meanings, a measure of linguistic distance
is the percentage of non-cognate words. Using the expected (weighted) measure of cognate distance led to e¤ects of
genetic distance very similar to those obtained when controlling for the Fearon measure, albeit on a much smaller
sample of countries speaking Indo-European languages. These results are available upon request.
40The two measures deviate from each other whenever a country includes populations speaking di¤erent languages.
Using the measure based on the plurality language or the weigthed measure did not make any di¤erence for our
results. As we did for genetic distance, we focus on weighted measures.
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linguistic distance (LD) rather than similarity, and are bounded by 0 and 1:
LD =
r
(15 # Common Nodes)
15
(21)
To measure religious distance we follow an approach based on religious trees, similar to that used
for linguistic distance, using a nomenclature of world religions obtained from Mecham, Fearon and
Laitin (2006). This nomenclature provides a family tree of World religions, rst distinguishing
between monotheistic religions of Middle-Eastern origin, Asian religions and "others", and further
subdividing these categories into ner groups (such as Christians, Muslims and Jews, etc.). The
number of common classications (up to 5 in this dataset) is a measure of religious similarity. We
match religions to countries using Mecham, Fearon and Laitins (2006) data on the prevalence of
religions by country and transform the data in a manner similar to that in equation (21), again
computing plurality and weighted distances separately.41
Table 6 presents estimates of the e¤ect of genetic distance on the propensity for interstate conict
when linguistic and religious distance are included. Since the use of these variables constrains the
sample (a loss of some 3; 154 observations, or almost 24% of the sample), we start in column (1)
with the baseline estimates for this new sample. They are in line with those reported above. When
adding linguistic distance and religious distance either alone or together (columns 2-4), interesting
results emerge. First, the coe¢ cient on genetic distance is barely a¤ected. Second, linguistic
distance exerts a null e¤ect when controlling for genetic distance. Third, religious distance is
negatively associated with conict, and this e¤ect is statistically signicant even when including
linguistic distance along with religious distance.42 The latter nding is consistent with the view
that religion is one of the vertically transmitted traits that make populations more or less related
to each other, and its e¤ect on conict goes in the same direction as that of genetic distance, a
broader measure of relatedness.43
41Pairwise correlations between measures of genetic, linguistic and religious distances are generally positive, as
expected, but not very large. For instance, the correlation between FST genetic distance and weighted linguistic
distance is 0:201. Religious distance (weighted) bears a correlation of 0:449 with linguistic distance, and 0:172 with
genetic distance.
42This result contrasts with that in Henderson (1997), who found evidence that religious similarity was negatively
related to conict. The di¤erence may stem from our use of a di¤erent (and more ne-grained) measure of religious
distance, our much bigger sample, as well as our inclusion of a much broader set of controls (Henderson only controlled
for contiguity).
43The estimated e¤ects of religious and linguistic distance do not change much when genetic distance is excluded
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4.4 Nonlinearities and Determinants of Conict Intensity
In this subsection, we consider several extensions of our baseline specication. Our goal is to
characterize whether relatedness may operate di¤erently for di¤erent pairs of countries, and to
investigate its e¤ect on the intensity of conict. To do so, we rst look for interactive and nonlinear
e¤ects of genetic distance (Table 7). We then seek to evaluate the e¤ect of genetic distance on
the intensity of conict, rather than on the binary indicator of whether a pair ever experienced a
conict (Table 8).
We rst isolate countries that are non contiguous. In the baseline sample, 20:6% of country
pairs having experienced conicts (i.e. 153 out of 744 pairs) involve contiguous countries, and
isolating pairs composed of non-contiguous countries is a further way to control for the possibility
that geographic factors drive the e¤ect of genetic distance (column 2 of Table 7). The standardized
e¤ect of genetic distance actually rises modestly, as a one standard deviation increase in genetic
distance is associated with a 27:34% decrease in the mean probability of having experienced a
conict (versus 23:83% in the baseline regression). This reinforces our condence that the e¤ect is
not driven by geographic factors or other possibly omitted factors specic to contiguous countries.
In columns (3) through (5) we add several interaction terms to the baseline specication. The
e¤ect of genetic distance does not appear quantitatively more or less pronounced for pairs that
include a major power or for pairs that are geographically proximate (i.e. countries are either
contiguous or separated by a distance less than 2; 500 km). We nd some evidence that the negative
e¤ect of genetic distance is reversed for pairs that are contiguous, although the proportion of
contiguous pairs in the sample is so low (and the number of conicts among them so small) that
care should be taken not to overinterpret this nding.
We then allow for a linear spline, i.e. a di¤erent slope for the e¤ect of genetic distance whether
it is greater than the sample median of 0:104, or lower. Column (6) shows no evidence of such
a di¤erential e¤ect (varying the spline threshold did not matter greatly). Finally, introducing a
squared term in genetic distance (column 7) does not reveal much evidence of a nonlinear e¤ect
either. In sum, we nd no evidence that the e¤ect of genetic distance depends on other pair
characteristics (such as geographic proximity) or that it is nonlinear.44
from the regression, although the (negative) e¤ect of linguistic distance on conict then becomes signicant at the
10% level. These results are available upon request.
44 In further tests available upon request, we allowed for nonlinear e¤ects of geographic distance to capture the
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Table 8 seeks to explain the intensity of militarized conict as opposed to its incidence only. To
do so, we modied the dependent variable in several ways. Column (1) simply uses the measure
of the intensity of conict from the Correlates of War dataset, rather than the binary transform
of this variable we have been using so far. The dependent variable is the maximal intensity of
conict experienced by each pair over the 1816-2001 period (this variable can take any discrete
value between 0 and 5). With least squares estimation, there is evidence that genetic distance
bears a negative relationship with conict intensity. However, column (2), limiting the sample to
pairs having experienced conict, demonstrates that genetic distance does not a¤ect the intensity
of conict (among levels 3, 4 and 5) once we condition on the subsample with conict: genetic
distance works only on the extensive margin. This result rationalizes our focus on a binary measure
of conict rather than on the multinomial measure. In line with results in Table 3, instrumenting
for current genetic distance using genetic distance based on the 1500 match of genetic groups to
countries increases the estimated magnitude of the e¤ect by over 60% (column 3).
In columns (4) and (5) we consider the determinants of war casualties, a variable obtained from
the Correlates of War database and dened as the sum of all casualties experienced in a bilateral
conict over the 1816-2001 period. We nd that genetic distance reduces total war casualties, but
again this e¤ect is almost entirely driven by the extensive margin, since genetic distance has a
statistically insignicant e¤ect on war casualties for observations with nonzero casualties. Finally,
we consider the same dependent variable but instrumenting for genetic distance using the measure
based on the 1500 match (column 6). Again, the e¤ect increases, this time by about 50%, and it
remains negative and highly signicant statistically.
To summarize, the e¤ect of genetic distance is very robust to using alternative measures of
conict. We also nd no evidence that genetic distance a¤ects the intensity of conict conditional
on a conict occurring.
4.5 Panel Analysis for the 1816-2001 Period
For the remainder of this paper, we exploit the panel dimension of the data in order to control for
time varying factors, such as whether a pair is composed of democratic countries, the intensity of
possibility that genetic distance may have captured the non-linear e¤ect of physical distance, nding no evidence of
this. We also allowed for an interaction term between genetic and geodesic distance, but this term was again found
to be insignicant.
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trade links between pairs, income di¤erences, and other time-varying factors potentially a¤ecting
conict. We begin by adding variables that are observed over the entire period (1816-2001) and in
the next subsection turn to a more restricted set of variables available only after 1953.
The dependent variable is now Cijt, an indicator of whether countries i and j were involved in
an interstate conict in year t. Table 4, column 1 presents baseline estimates from the panel speci-
cation of equation (20) over the period 1816-2001. This specication contains the same controls as
the baseline cross-sectional regression, but is estimated over 517; 251 data points corresponding to
multiple years observed on the underlying 13; 175 country pairs. Standard errors are now clustered
at the country pair level. We replicate our basic ndings, although the standardized magnitude of
the e¤ect of genetic distance falls by about half compared to the cross-sectional specication. A
possible reason is that the share of observations where Cijt = 1 in the panel sample is much smaller
than the share of observations with Cij = 1 in the cross-section. In the panel, there are 1; 010
wars and 3; 728 conicts, or 0:20% and 0:72% of the sample, respectively, while in the cross-section
2:09% of the pairs were ever at war, and 5:65% of them were ever in conict over 1816-2001.
In subsequent columns, we add time varying controls. In addition to indicators of conict,
the Correlates of War database includes several other useful time-varying bilateral variables such
an indicator of whether a pair is linked by an active military alliance, the number of other wars
occurring in a given year, and the number of peaceful years in a country pair (i; j) at each time t.45
Including these variables does not greatly modify the e¤ect of genetic distance (column 2), and the
added controls bear coe¢ cients with the expected signs.
In column 3, we include a dummy variable for whether both countries in the pair are democratic
(dened as both having a Polity score in excess of 5). In this specication, the standardized
magnitude of the e¤ect of genetic distance is 8:52% of the mean percentage probability of conict.
The results provide evidence for a central tenet of liberal peace theory, namely the idea that
democracies tend not to go to war with each other: the dummy for both countries being democratic
has a negative and highly signicant marginal e¤ect, with roughly the same magnitude as that of
genetic distance. The results also suggest that past ndings on the pacifying e¤ects of democracy
did not capture the e¤ects of cultural relatedness working through institutional similarity.
Finally, in column 4, we add the absolute di¤erence in an index of national capabilities. For each
country in a pair, the Correlates of War database provides an index of overall military capability
45These variables are also controls in Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008), Table 3, pp. 883.
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(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1972). This index is the average of underlying indices of iron and
steel production, urban population, total population, total military expenditures, total military
personnel and total energy production, and is meant to capture the countrys ability to wage war
successfully relative to other countries at a given point in time.46 It is important for us to control
for military capabilities because genetic distance may partly capture di¤erences in capabilities.
As discussed in the theoretical section, if similarity in military capabilities is persistent across
generations, and if it a¤ects the probability of conict positively, omitting it may overstate the
e¤ect of genealogical relatedness on conict working through more similar preferences over the
object of dispute. We nd in fact that including the absolute di¤erence in the index of military
capabilities barely reduces the standardized e¤ect of genetic distance.47
4.6 Panel Analysis for the 1953-2000 Period
Several important correlates of war, such as measures of trade intensity and di¤erences in income,
are missing from our specication due to their lack of availability over the long time period covered
by the baseline specication (1816-2001). In order to incorporate these additional controls, we
focus on the 1953-2000 period for which various measures of trade and income are available. We
continue to condition on the full set of controls from column 4 of Table 9 in all the regressions that
follow.
A long tradition associated with liberal peace theory, going back to Montesquieu (1748) and
Kant (1795), holds that extensive bilateral commercial links between countries reduce the prob-
ability of conict, since valuable gains from trade would be lost in a militarized conict. In an
important contribution to the literature on interstate conict, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008,
henceforth MMT) added an additional hypothesis: if the countries in a pair trade a lot with third
parties, their bilateral trading link matters less, so controlling for bilateral trade, multilateral trade
intensity should increase the probability of conict among the countries in a pair. The issue we
face is that the omission of these trade terms may bias the coe¢ cient estimate on genetic distance,
46We also tried to examine what happens when we enter the absolute bilateral di¤erences in the subcomponents
of the index of national capabilities separately, or all of them jointly instead of the index. We found no systematic
pattern in the e¤ects of these various measures of di¤erences in capabilities on the likelihood of conict, and none of
them - either separately or jointly - a¤ected in any material way the coe¢ cient on genetic distance.
47All of the robustness checks presented above in the cross-sectional context were carried out in the panel context
as well, and were described in previous versions of this paper. They are available upon request.
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to the extent that genetic distance and trade are correlated.
We obtained the data on bilateral and multilateral trade openness used in MMTs paper, and
included their measures of trade in our baseline specication.48 These measures include a metric of
bilateral trade openness (the ratio of bilateral imports to GDP, averaged across the two countries
in a pair), a metric of multilateral trade intensity (dened as the ratio of the sum of all bilateral
imports from third countries to GDP, averaged between the two countries in a pair), and the
interaction of each of these metrics with log geodesic distance. All of these measures were lagged
by 4 years to limit the incidence of reverse causality running from conict to trade, exactly as was
done in MMT.
Results appear in Table 10. In column (1), we replicate the baseline specication for the smaller
sample covering 1953-2000. The e¤ect of genetic distance in this sample is slightly smaller than in
the 1816-2001 sample: a standard deviation increase in genetic distance reduces the probability of
conict by 6:58% of this variables mean. In column 2, we recover exactly the pattern of coe¢ cients
on the trade terms found in MMT: bilateral openness reduces conict, multilateral openness raises
conict, and these e¤ects are more pronounced quantitatively for pairs that are closer to each other.
Thus, our ndings lend further support to liberal peace theory, as recently amended by MMT. The
e¤ect of genetic distance falls a bit more in the specication that includes the trade terms, but it
remains negative and highly signicant statistically. In column (3), we include additional trade-
related variables: a dummy for whether the two countries in a pair belong to a free trade area, and
the number of GATT members in the pair. The coe¢ cient on genetic distance is barely a¤ected.
Another omitted variables concern stems from our results in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009),
where genetic distance was found to be robustly correlated with absolute di¤erences in per capita
income across pairs of countries. To the extent that di¤erences in income capture power imbalances,
or the extent of possible spoils of war, they may inuence the probability of conict (this could go
in either direction: power imbalances may make a weaker prey easier to capture militarily, but also
more willing to surrender peacefully). In column (5), we add the absolute value of the bilateral
di¤erence in log per capita income (the same variable used as a dependent variable in Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2009) to the specication that includes the broadest set of controls (including trade
controls from MMT).49 The coe¢ cient on income di¤erences is positive and signicant, indicating
48The data was obtained from http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/data/data.htm
49The source for the income data is the Penn World Tables, version 6.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2002).
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that heterogeneity in income levels across the countries in a pair is conducive to conict, but its
inclusion does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient on genetic distance. Finally, column (6) substitutes the
absolute di¤erence in total GDP instead of di¤erences in per capita GDP. This can be viewed as
an alternative measure of di¤erences in national capabilities. Heterogeneity in total GDP does not
a¤ect conict propensity, and its inclusion does not a¤ect the coe¢ cient on genetic distance.
To summarize, the inclusion of a wide set of trade-related controls and of income di¤erences,
while conrming past results in MMT, does not change the basic message that relatedness has a
positive e¤ect on conict.
5 Conclusion
The central insight of this paper is that populations that are more closely related are more likely to
share preferences over rival goods, and are therefore more likely to enter into conicts. Examining
the empirical relationship between the occurrence of interstate conicts and the degree of relatedness
between countries, we found that populations that are genetically closer are indeed more prone to
engage in militarized conicts. This empirical result is large in magnitude and robust to controlling
for several measures of geographic distance, income di¤erences, and other factors a¤ecting conict,
including measures of bilateral and multilateral trade and di¤erences in democracy levels. These
results provide strong evidence against the primordialist view that cultural and ethnic dissimilarity
should breed war, plunder and a clash of civilizations. On the contrary, our ndings suggest that
war and peace across nations are (unhappy) family matters.
In theory, relatedness impacts conict di¤erently depending on the nature of the prize under
dispute. An important distinction brought to the fore by this paper is that between private and
public goods. Di¤erences in preferences over private goods should lower the probability of conict,
while di¤erences in preferences over public goods should increase it. Interstate conict provides
an ideal laboratory to test this idea, because most international conicts are about rival goods:
territory, resources, control of strategic routes. Thus, we expect to nd that a broad measure
of di¤erences in intergenerationally transmitted traits - genetic distance - should be negatively
correlated with the probability of conict. Empirically, we do.
The fact that civil wars can span the spectrum of conicts over rival to public goods might
explain the mixed results found in the literature concerning the e¤ect of ethnic divisions on the
onset of civil wars. If all civil conicts were about the type of public goods (location of the national
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capital, language of instruction in schools, etc.), we should expect similarity in preferences, and thus
historical relatedness, to reduce conict. Since civil wars are often also about private goods - such as
territory or resource transfers from a central government - we expect ambiguous predictions on the
e¤ect of ethnic, cultural and historical relatedness on the onset of civil conict. This ambiguous
relationship is reected in the empirical literature on this question, where the e¤ect of ethnic
divisions is not a settled matter. Further explorations of this interesting issue are left for future
research.
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Appendix
A.1. Peaceful Bargaining
In our basic model, the two states engage in conict when both strongly care about the prize.
However, conict is costly, and both states would be better o¤ if they could agree on an allocation
of the prize that replicates the expected allocation from conict, without bearing the actual costs
from violent confrontation. For instance, if the prize is divisible, the two states would be better o¤
by sharing it in proportion to their relative power - i.e., state i would obtain a share equal to i
and state j would obtain a share equal to (1   i). If the prize is indivisible, the states could in
principle agree to a lottery where each has a probability of winning the prize equal to its probability
of winning the war, therefore saving the costs of going to war. However, even abstracting from
issues of imperfect information, it might be extremely di¢ cult to implement such a solution ex
post (the loser may prefer to go to war after all). Even in the case of a divisible prize, states may
have an incentive to unilaterally renege from the bargaining solution, and a war may occur as an
equilibrium because each state would be better o¤ ghting than surrendering when the other state
ghts. In fact, war may be the only equilibrium if each state faces a positive incentive to go to war
unilaterally when the other state has agreed to a peaceful negotiation. In the absence of incentives
to deviate unilaterally from peaceful bargaining, multiple equilibria may occur: war and peaceful
bargaining.
In the latter case, more closely related populations, which share more recent common ancestors
and hence may be more similar culturally, linguistically, etc., might be more successful at com-
municating and coordinating on the e¢ cient equilibrium. If the probability of solving the conict
via peaceful bargaining is indeed higher for more closely related populations, this coordination
e¤ect could reduce or o¤set the main e¤ect stemming from similarity in preferences. Then, the
net e¤ect of genetic distance on conict would be ambiguous. However, coordinating on peaceful
bargaining in an anarchic international environment, in the absence of credible commitment tech-
nologies, might be relatively rare. Moreover, the hypothesis that more closely related populations
are better at coordination is purely speculative, and one could conceive of reasons why coordination
may be harder among people who care more strongly about the same rival and excludable goods.
Therefore, it is not clear, ex ante, whether such coordination e¤ect would reduce or eliminate the
main e¤ect of relatedness highlighted in our model. As we have seen in Section 4, the empirical
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evidence is consistent with the main e¤ect in our model dominating any countervailing e¤ect from
coordination on peaceful bargaining. These ideas are formalized below with a simple extension of
our basic model of conict over rival goods.
Consider an extension of the basic model, where peaceful bargaining can follow the choice of
actions fC;Fg - which are now re-interpreted as {challenge, respond to challenge} rather than
{challenge, ght}. Assume that, if state j challenges and state i responds to the challenge, each
player can choose whether to bargain (B) or to go to war (W ). If both choose "bargain," the prize
is divided peacefully between the two states, and the two states obtain benets equal to ibi and
(1   j)bj ; respectively. That is because we assume that a states bargaining power depends on
its strength should negotiations break down (peaceful bargaining takes place "under the shadow of
war").50 If both states choose W , war follows, with the same payo¤s as in the basic model. If state
i chooses W while state j chooses B, war also follows, but with the following payo¤s:
UifW;Bg = (1 + )ibi   ci (22)
and
UjfW;Bg = [1  (1 + )i]bj   cj (23)
where
0 <   1
i
  1 (24)
The parameter  captures the increased probability of winning that results from being the initiator
of the conict, in the tradition of Schelling (1960).51 By the same token, if state i chooses B in the
sub-game, but state j chooses W , the payo¤s are
UifB;Wg = [1  (1 + )(1  i)]bi   ci (25)
and
UjfB;Wg = (1 + )(1  i)bj   cj (26)
Under these assumptions, if one state plays W , the other state is better o¤ playing W rather
than B, which implies that fW;Wg is a Nash equilibrium of the sub-game for all values of the
50This is a common assumption in the literature. For example, see Alesina and Spolaore (2005).
51Analogous results could be obtained by also assuming that the initiator of the conict faces lower war costs. We
abstract from this possibility to keep notation simple.
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parameters. However, fW;Wg may or may not be the unique Nash equilibrium. If fW;Wg is the
unique Nash equilibrium, the implications of this extension are the same as the basic models. If
fB;Bg is also a Nash equilibrium, war may be avoided if both states coordinate on the peaceful
equilibrium. Therefore, our model is consistent with Fearons (1995) discussion of war as emerging
from an inability to commit to a Pareto-superior outcome. In our framework both states would
be better o¤ if each could commit to play B, but they can do that credibly only if fB;Bg is also
a Nash equilibrium. For the symmetric case (i = 12 and ci = cj = c), a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for fB;Bg to be an equilibrium of the sub-game is
  2c
minfbi; bjg (27)
The intuition for the above condition is straightforward: the parameter capturing the unilateral
incentives to deviate from bargaining must be small enough for fB;Bg to be a Nash equilibrium
of the sub-game. If fB;Bg is a Nash equilibrium of the sub-game, it is the unique coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium. Three cases are possible: (i) states never coordinate on such an equilibrium even
when the condition holds, (ii) states always coordinate on such equilibrium when available, and (iii)
sometimes states coordinate, while other times they dont (coordination failure). Cases (i) and (ii)
do not modify the implications of the basic model regarding the e¤ect of relatedness on conict.
Relatedness is positively associated with the probability of war whenever conict occurs - i.e., for
all values of  in case (i), and for  > 2cminfbi;bjg in case (ii).
The e¤ect of relatedness on conict could in principle be modied in case (iii), if the likelihood
of observing a coordination failure happened to depend on relatedness. For instance, coordination
failure could be more likely across populations that are genealogically more distant, because their
norms, habits, languages etc. would tend to be more di¤erent, and they might therefore nd
communication and coordination more di¢ cult. If that were the case, such "coordination failure
e¤ect" would reduce the negative correlation between genetic distance and probability of conict.
However, a priori, and in the absence of a compelling theory of "equilibrium selection," there is no
strong reason to expect that coordination failure would be less likely among more closely related
populations. The relationship might even go in the opposite direction: coordination failure could
be more likely between more closely related populations - for example, because of mistrust and
animosity due to a history of previous conicts over other rival goods. In the latter case, the
e¤ect of relatedness on conict would be strengthened. As we have seen in the empirical section,
the net e¤ect of genetic distance on conict is negative. This is consistent with two possibilities:
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(a) coordination failure is not less likely among more closely related populations, (b) coordination
failure is less likely among more closely related populations, but this e¤ect is not large enough
empirically to o¤set the main e¤ect of relatedness on conict highlighted by the basic model.
A.2. Conict over Public Goods
In our basic model the prize is a rival and excludable good, and the type of the rival good is
given (that is, it cannot be changed by either player). We now consider the polar case, where the
prize is a pure public good, non-rival in consumption, and the player in control can choose whether
the public good is of type A or B.52 That is, the conict is not about controlling access to the
good (both players benet from the good no matter who "owns" it), but about controlling the type
(e.g., the characteristics of a public policy or service): the "winner" will select his/her favored type
of public good. Hence, utilities from the public good are given as follows:
a) If player i and player j are of the same type, both obtain maximum benets R from the good
no matter who is in control:
bi = bj = R (28)
b) If the two players are of di¤erent types, and player i is in control of the public good, the respective
benets are
bi = R (29)
bj = (1  jtA   tBj)R (30)
c) conversely, if the two players are of di¤erent types, and player j is in control of the public good,
we have:
bi = (1  jtA   tBj)R (31)
bj = R (32)
Now, there is no reason for conict between two players of the same type: if player i is of the same
type as player j, player j will obtain the same utility as if he/she were in control of the good. In
contrast, if player i is of a di¤erent type, player j could increase his/her utility by seizing control
52 In this extension we refer to "players" rather than "states" consistently with our view that conict over types of
public goods is more likely to occur among agents engaged in intrastate conict rather than interstate conict.
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of the good and changing the type. Hence, now a necessary condition for war is that the players
are of di¤erent types. Then, player is expected utility from going to war is
iR+ (1  i)[1  jtA   tBj]R  ci (33)
and he/she will prefer to ght for
iR+ (1  i)(1  jtA   tBj)R  ci > (1  jtA   tBj)R (34)
which can be re-written as
i(jtA   tBj)R  ci > 0 (35)
By the same token, player js will prefer war over "no challenge" for
(1  i)(jtA   tBj)R  cj > 0 (36)
In the symmetric case (i = 1=2 and ci = cj = c) the two conditions become
c < (jtA   tBj)R
2
(37)
If the condition above is satised (i.e., the war costs are small enough), the probability that player
i and player j engage in conict is equal to the probability that they are not of the same type. For
sibling populations (dg(i; j) = 1), the probability that they are not of the same type is:
Pfi; j j dg(i; j) = 1g = 1  F () = 1  [2 + (1  )2] (38)
while for cousin populations (dg(i; j) = 2), the probability that both are of di¤erent types is
Pfi; j j dg(i; j) = 2g = 1 G() = 1  [4 + 62(1  )2 + (1  )4] (39)
As we have shown in Section 2, F () > G() for all 1=2 <  < 1,which immediately implies
Pfi; jjdg(i; j) = 1g < Pfi; j j dg(i; j) = 2g (40)
that is, we have:
Proposition 2A
When conict is about the control of public-good types, the probability of violent conict is higher
between groups that are less closely related.
A.3 A General Framework
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The two basic models (conict over pure rival goods and conict over pure public goods) can
be viewed as two special cases of a more general framework where: (a) there may be externalities
in consumption, and (b) the player in control of the prize may be able to change the goods type.
Formally:
(a) when player i is in control of the prize, player js benets are bj and when player j is in
control, player is benets are bi where 0    1:
(b) when a player is in control of the prize of type A, he/she can change the type to B (and
vice versa, can change type B to type A), with probability  (0    1).
Our basic model of conict over rival goods is the case  =  = 0, while the model of conict
over public goods in Appendix A.2 is the polar case  =  = 1:
In general, two players with the same preferences will go to war with each other at low levels of 
(for all ), while two players with di¤erent preferences will go to war with each other for high levels of
, when  > 0. These results generalize the insights from the basic models: similarity in preferences
leads to more conict over goods with zero or low externalities (low ), while dissimilarity in
preferences leads to more conict when agents in control of a non-rival good ( > 0) can change
the goods type (high ). Formally, we have:
Proposition A3.1
For all , there exists a critical  = 1   2c
R
such that two players of the same type will go to
war for  <  and will not go to war for  > :53
Proof. Two players of the same type X(X = A;B) will not go to war over a good of type X if
1
2
R+
1
2
R  c < R (41)
and will not go to war over a good of type Y 6= X if
1
2
[R+(1 )(1 jtA tBj)R]+ 1
2
[R+(1 )(1 jtA tBj)R] c < [R+(1 )(1 jtA tBj)R]
(42)
which can be re-written, respectively, as54
 < 1  2c
R
(43)
53Multiple equilibria, with and without conict, exist in the knife-edge case  = :
54For  = 0, the condition below reduces to the condition for war in the case of pure rival goods: c < 1
2
R:
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and
 < 1  2c
R[1  (1  )jtA   tBj] (44)
For all 0    1; we have
1  2c
R
 1  2c
R[1  (1  )jtA   tBj] (45)
Therefore, for all  >   1   2c
R
we also have  > 1   2c
R[1  (1  )jtA   tBj] , and no war ever
takes place between two players with the same preferences. In contrast, for  < , the two players
will go to war. QED.
In contrast, conict between players with di¤erent preferences is characterized by the following
proposition:
Proposition A3.2
For all  > 0, two players with di¤erent preferences will go to war for  > ; where55
 =
1
jtA   tBj minf1 
1

(1  2c
R
) ;
2c
R
  (1  )[1  jtA   tBj]g (46)
Proof. When two players have di¤erent preferences, the player whose preferred type is the same
as the prize will go to war if
1
2
R+
1
2
[(1  jtA   tBj)R+ (1  )R]  c > [(1  jtA   tBj)R+ (1  )R] (47)
while the other player will go to war if
1
2
[R+ (1  )(1  jtA   tBj)R] + 1
2
(1  jtA   tBj)R  c > (1  jtA   tBj)R (48)
The above equations can be re-written as
 >
1  1

(1  2c
R
)
jtA   tBj (49)
and
 >
2c
R   (1  )(1  jtA   tBj)
jtA   tBj (50)
Both conditions hold if  > : QED.
55 In the case  =  = 1, the condition below reduces to the condition for war in the case of pure public goods:
c < (jtA   tB j)R
2
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Table 1 – Summary statistics and correlations for major variables 
 
 
Panel A – Summary Statistics 
 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conflict (%)     13,175 0.056 0.231 0 1
War (%)     13,175 0.021 0.143 0 1
Fst genetic distance, weighted     13,175 0.111 0.068 0 0.355
Log geodesic distance     13,175 8.700 0.787 2.349 9.899
Dummy for contiguity     13,175 0.019 0.136 0 1
Religious Distance Index, 
weighted     10,155 0.846 0.149 0.089 1
Linguistic Distance Index, 
weighted     10,021 0.968 0.107 0 1
 
 
 
Panel B – Pairwise Correlations 
 
 Conflict 
(%) 
War (%) FST 
genetic 
distance 
Log 
geodesic 
distance 
Contiguity Religious 
distance 
War (%) 0.597* 1   
(13,175) (13,175)   
Fst genetic  -0.169* -0.107* 1   
distance, weighted (13,175) (13,175) (13,175)   
Log geodesic  -0.217* -0.105* 0.434* 1   
distance (13,175) (13,175) (13,175) (13,175)   
Dummy for  0.337* 0.164* -0.146* -0.362* 1  
contiguity (13,175) (13,175) (13,175) (13,175) (13,175)  
Religious Distance  -0.132* -0.052* 0.168* 0.211* -0.140* 1 
Index, weighted (10,155) (10,155) (10,155) (10,155) (10,155) (10,155) 
Linguistic Distance  -0.140* -0.073* 0.201* 0.240* -0.194* 0.449* 
Index, weighted (10,021) (10,021) (10,021) (10,021) (10,021) (10,021) 
(# of observations in parentheses; * denotes significance at the 5% level) 
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Table 2 – Distribution of War and Conflict, by Quartile of Genetic Distance 
 
Conditioning 
statement: 
Bottom 
decile of 
genetic 
distance 
0-25th 
percentile 
of genetic 
distance 
25-50th 
percentile 
of genetic 
distance 
50-75th 
percentile 
of genetic 
distance 
75-100th 
percentile 
of genetic 
distance* 
Total 
Hostility level = 5 (War) 
None 76 148 70 47 10 275
27.64% 53.82% 25.45% 17.09% 3.64% 100%
Common sea /  49 107 56 42 10 215
ocean = 0 22.79% 49.77% 26.05% 19.53% 4.65% 100%
Contiguity = 0 52 117 55 46 10 228
22.81% 51.32% 24.12% 20.18% 4.39% 100%
Distance > 1000  54 119 56 47 10 232
km 23.28% 51.29% 24.14% 20.26% 4.31% 100%
Hostility Level > 3 (Conflict) 
None 188 400 195 103 46 744
25.27% 53.76% 26.21% 13.84% 6.18% 100.00%
Common sea /  123 283 138 81 41 543
ocean = 0 22.65% 52.12% 25.41% 14.92% 7.55% 100.00%
Contiguity = 0 124 297 153 96 45 591
20.98% 50.25% 25.89% 16.24% 7.61% 100.00%
Distance > 1000  119 301 165 101 46 613
km 19.41% 49.10% 26.92% 16.48% 7.50% 100.00%
Based on an underlying sample of 13,175 country pairs. 
* 7 of the 10 cases in rows 3-6 involve South Africa as a combatant. 
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Table 9: Panel analysis, 1816-2001 
(Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Baseline 
specification 
Add some 
time-varying 
controls 
Add dummy 
for both 
democracies 
Add difference 
in national 
capabilities 
index 
Fst genetic distance -1.3230** -0.9305** -0.9313** -0.8092**
 (-5.796) (-8.642) (-8.922) (-8.417)
Log geodesic distance -0.1518** -0.0743** -0.0735** -0.0534**
 (-4.671) (-4.379) (-4.487) (-3.998)
Log absolute difference  -0.0165 -0.0027 -0.0003 -0.0163
in longitudes (-0.796) (-0.270) (-0.029) (-1.933)
Log absolute difference  -0.0607** -0.0280** -0.0250** -0.0258**
in latitudes (-3.309) (-3.100) (-2.927) (-3.474)
1 for contiguity 0.8463** 0.4443** 0.4227** 0.4862**
 (7.235) (7.760) (7.760) (8.399)
Number of landlocked  -0.2059** -0.1267** -0.1197** -0.1009**
countries in the pair (-6.224) (-7.541) (-7.553) (-6.800)
Number of island  0.1720** 0.0503** 0.0551** 0.0540**
countries in the pair (4.371) (2.593) (2.969) (3.116)
1 if pair shares at least  0.0674 0.1002** 0.1029** 0.0679**
one sea or ocean (1.648) (4.212) (4.501) (3.364)
Log product of land areas in  0.0979** 0.0544** 0.0511** 0.0376**
square km (13.164) (15.532) (15.762) (12.083)
1 for pairs ever in colonial  0.2483** 0.1152** 0.1478** 0.1270**
relationship (3.066) (2.797) (3.413) (3.227)
1 if countries were or are the  0.0229 0.0457 0.0444 0.0679
same country (0.262) (1.005) (1.021) (1.592)
Number of peaceful years -0.0070** -0.0066** -0.0059**
 (-14.021) (-13.545) (-13.687)
Number of other conflicts  0.0037** 0.0035** 0.0035**
in year t (16.334) (16.748) (18.425)
Dummy for alliance active  -0.0667** -0.0593** -0.0604**
in year t (-5.150) (-4.686) (-5.505)
1 if both countries are  -0.0935** -0.0910**
democracies (polity2>5) (-8.670) (-8.088)
Absolute difference in   1.1408**
National Capabilities Index  (13.621)
Pseudo-R2 0.210 0.295 0.300 0.321
Standardized effect -12.11 -8.513 -8.521 -7.395
Robust t statistics in parentheses  (clustering at the country pair level); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage 
of the mean probability of conflict. Probit marginal effects reported throughout. For dummy variables, marginal 
effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability 
(underlying average probability of conflict is 0.72%). 
All specifications were estimated with 517,251 observations from 13,175 country pairs. 
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Table 10: Post-1953 analysis, controlling for trade variables and absolute income differences 
(Dependent variable: dichotomous indicator of conflict; estimator: probit) 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
 Baseline 
with 
common 
sample 
Control for 
trade terms 
Additional 
trade terms 
Add per 
capita 
income 
difference 
Add total 
income 
difference 
Fst genetic  -0.5195** -0.3419** -0.3253** -0.3689** -0.3301**
distance (-6.964) (-5.784) (-5.475) (-5.335) (-4.512)
Log geodesic  -0.0120 0.0056 0.0052 0.0015 0.0031
distance (-1.793) (0.795) (0.721) (0.223) (0.434)
1 for contiguity 0.2856** 0.2396** 0.2325** 0.2932** 0.2527**
 (6.907) (7.494) (7.469) (7.620) (7.235)
1 if both countries  -0.0412** -0.0321** -0.0249** -0.0214** -0.0257**
are democracies  (-5.140) (-5.257) (-3.845) (-3.073) (-3.699)
Absolute difference in  0.4063** 0.1641* 0.1516* 0.1758* 0.2291*
national capabilities index (5.018) (2.116) (1.983) (1.968) (2.325)
Log bilateral  -0.0405** -0.0386** -0.0349** -0.0387**
openness, t-4 (-4.521) (-4.283) (-3.844) (-3.996)
Log multilateral  0.0459 0.0512 0.0010 0.0142
openness, t-4 (1.523) (1.735) (0.033) (0.423)
Log distance * log  -0.0079* -0.0085* -0.0027 -0.0045
mult. openness (-2.034) (-2.249) (-0.681) (-1.062)
Log distance * log  0.0052** 0.0050** 0.0045** 0.0050**
bilateral openness (4.650) (4.481) (3.910) (4.076)
Dummy for zero  -0.0176* -0.0173* -0.0146 -0.0158*
trade, t-4 (-2.524) (-2.557) (-1.947) (-2.050)
Free trade area  -0.0242** -0.0217* -0.0230*
(full set) (-2.824) (-2.260) (-2.533)
# of GATT  -0.0150** -0.0166** -0.0177**
members (-3.723) (-3.893) (-4.149)
Absolute diff. in  1.6054** 
log p.c. income (4.650) 
Absolute diff. in   -0.0519
total GDP  (-0.195)
# of observations 226,357 226,357 226,357 202,523 202,523
(# of pairs) (9,127) (9,127) (9,127) (9,127) (9,127)
Pseudo R2 0.341 0.351 0.354 0.357 0.352
Standardized effect -6.576 -4.328 -4.118 -5.248 -4.695
Robust t statistics in parentheses (clustering at the country pair level); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
The standardized magnitude is the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genetic distance as a percentage of 
the mean probability of conflict. Probit marginal effects reported in all columns. For dummy variables, marginal 
effects are for discrete changes from 0 to 1. All marginal effects were multiplied by 100 for readability. 
Controls: In addition to reported coefficients, every column includes controls for: Log absolute difference in 
longitudes, log absolute difference in latitudes, number of landlocked countries in the pair, number of island 
countries in the pair, dummy=1 if pair shares at least one sea or ocean, log product of land areas in square km, 
dummy=1 if both countries are democracies (polity2>5), dummy=1 for pairs ever in colonial relationship, 
dummy=1 if countries were or are the same country, number of peaceful years, number of other wars in year t, 
dummy for alliance active in year t. 
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